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Wills, Trusts, Guardianships, and
Fiduciary Administration
by Mary F. Radford*
This Article describes selected cases and significant legislation from
June 1, 2012 through May 31, 2013 pertaining to Georgia fiduciary law
and estate planning.1
I.

GEORGIA CASES

Year's Support
Under Georgia law, the spouse and minor children of a decedent are
entitled to petition for a "year's support" from the decedent's estate.
The procedure for awarding year's support is set out clearly in the
Georgia Probate Code3 but is still the object of some confusion in the
courts. Basically, the Probate Code provides that the surviving spouse
or minor children must file a petition in which they list the property
that they are requesting be awarded to them to provide the year's

A.

* Marjorie Fine Knowles Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law.
Newcomb College of Tulane University (B.A., 1974); Emory University (J.D., 1981).
Reporter, Probate Code Revision Committee, Guardianship Code Revision Committee, and
Trust Code Revision Committee of the Fiduciary Section of the State Bar of Georgia. Past
President, American College of Trust and Estate Counsel.
Author, GEORGIA
GUARDIANSHIPS AND CONSERVATORSHIPS (2013-2014 ed.); GEORGIA TRUSTS & TRUSTEES
(2013-2014 ed.); REDFEARN: WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION IN GEORGIA (7th ed. 2008). The
Author would like to thank Sarah Kinsman (Georgia State University Law School, 2014
J.D. candidate) for her invaluable research assistance.
1. For an analysis of Georgia fiduciary law and estate planning during the prior survey
period, see Mary F. Radford, Wills, Trusts, Guardianships,and FiduciaryAdministration,
Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 64 MERCER L. REV. 325 (2012).
2. O.C.G.A. § 53-3-1 (2011). There is no requirement that all of these individuals file
for year's support. O.C.G.A. § 53-3-5 (2011). The spouse alone, or the minor children
alone, or both may file. Id. For an in-depth discussion of year's support see MARY F.
RADFORD, REDFEARN: WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION IN GEORGIA ch. 10 (7th ed. 2008).
3.

O.C.G.A. ch. 53-3 (2011).
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support." Notice is issued to the decedent's other children, spouse (if the
spouse is not a petitioner), other heirs, beneficiaries under the decedent's
will (if any), creditors, and any others who have claims against the
estate that may be affected if year's support is awarded.' If no one
objects to the petition, the probate judge must enter an order awarding
the property requested in the petition.6 Only if an objection is filed will
the judge hold a hearing to determine whether the property requested
is in fact needed "to maintain the standard of living that the surviving
spouse and each minor child had prior to the death of the decedent."'
If an objection is filed, the individuals petitioning for year's support have
the burden of proving that the amount they requested is necessary.8
In Garren v. Garren, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that the
Superior Court of Fannin County erred because it required the surviving
spouse to prove that the amount she requested was necessary for a
year's support even though no objection had been raised. 0 When the
spouse filed her petition in the Probate Court of Fannin County, no
formal objection was filed; however, her son later testified that he had
submitted a letter to the probate court signed by him and his mother
withdrawing the petition. After the probate court granted his mother
the property she requested, the son appealed to the superior court."
The superior court made a determination that the letter was not a
properly-filed objection, but then set aside the grant of year's support to
the mother. The superior court stated that the mother had not carried
her burden of proving that she in fact needed the property that she had
requested to maintain her standard of living. The mother responded
that, because no objection to her petition had been filed, she was not
required to provide any evidence or otherwise prove her need for the
property she had requested." The court of appeals agreed with the

4. O.C.G.A. § 53-3-5.
5. O.C.G.A. § 53-3-6 (2011).
6. O.C.G.A. § 53-3-7(a) (2011).
7. O.C.G.A. § 53-3-7(c) (2011). In making this determination, the judge must take into
consideration the other sources of support of the petitioners, the solvency of the estate, and
"[sluch other relevant criteria as the court deems equitable and proper." Id.
8. Id.
9. 316 Ga. App. 646, 730 S.E.2d 123 (2012).
10. Id. at 649, 730 S.E.2d at 126.
11. Id. at 646, 730 S.E.2d at 124-25. For those Georgia probate courts in counties with
populations under 90,000, appeals are taken to the superior court. O.C.G.A. § 5-3-2 (2013);
O.C.G.A. § 5-3-20 (2013); O.C.G.A. § 15-9-120 (2012). The appeal is "de novo," which means
that "[ilt brings up the whole record from the court below[,] and all competent evidence
shall be admissible on the trial thereof, whether adduced on a former trial or not."
O.C.G.A. § 5-3-29 (2013).
12. Garren,316 Ga. App. at 646-47, 730 S.E.2d at 124-25.
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mother, noting that the only issue before the superior court was whether
the letter was a properly-filed objection." Once the superior court had
determined that it was not, there was no shifting of the burden of proof
to the mother, and the property she requested should have been awarded
to her as a year's support."
B.

No-Contest Clauses in Wills and Trusts
If a testator (the individual who makes a will) or the settlor of a trust
wishes to discourage the beneficiaries from attacking the terms of the
will or trust, the testator or settlor may include a "no-contest" or "in
terrorem" clause in the governing document." A no-contest clause
typically provides that a beneficiary who contests the validity of the will
or trust will forfeit any interest that the beneficiary would otherwise
take under the will or trust." Both the Georgia Probate Code" and
the Georgia Trust Code" recognize the validity of such clauses provided
that the will or trust contains a direction as to the disposition of the
forfeited property in the event the clause is violated; however, because
these clauses result in the forfeiture of a beneficiary's interest, nocontest clauses are not favored in the law and must always be strictly
construed.2 0 Two cases decided during the reporting period illustrate
that the courts will enforce these clauses, but if, and only if, the actual
terms of the clause are violated.21
The no-contest clause in a will that was at issue in Norman v.
Gober" involved the event that "any beneficiary" should "contest or
initiate legal proceedings to contest the validity of this Will or any
provision herein."2 3 In an earlier phase of the litigation surrounding
the testator's will, the eleven-year-old grandson of the testator filed a
caveat to the will." The Georgia Supreme Court determined that the
13. Id. at 648-49, 730 S.E.2d at 126.
14. Id. at 649, 730 S.E.2d at 126.
15.

See discussions of these clauses in RADFORD, WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION, supra

note 2, at §§ 2:1, 8:7; IARY F. RADFORD, GEORGIA TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 2:1 (2011).
16.
17.

RADFORD, WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 2,
O.C.G.A. § 53-4-68(b) (2011).

§

8:7.

18. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-22(b) (2011).
19. O.C.G.A. § 53-4-68(b), O.C.G.A. § 53-12-22(b).
20. Preuss v. Stokes-Preuss, 275 Ga. 437, 438, 569 S.E.2d 857, 858 (2002); see also
Linkous v. Nat'1 Bank of Ga., 247 Ga. 274, 274 S.E.2d 469, 470 (1981).
21. Norman v. Gober (Norman II), 292 Ga. 351, 737 S.E.2d 309 (2013); Callaway v.
Willard, 321 Ga. App. 349, 739 S.E.2d 533 (2013).
22. 292 Ga. 351, 737 S.E.2d 309 (2013).
23. Id. at 353 n.1, 737 S.E.2d at 310 n.1.
24. Id. at 351, 737 S.E.2d at 309. A caveat is an objection to the admission of the will
to probate and may be filed by any person who would be injured were the will to be
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grandson was not someone who would take if the will was found to be
invalid, and thus, he did not have standing to file a caveat.25 After the
supreme court's decision was issued, the co-executors filed a petition for
declaratory judgment in which they sought to determine who was
responsible for filing the caveat. The co-executors reasoned that if the
caveat had been instigated by one of the beneficiaries (that is, the
caveator's mother), this may have constituted a violation by her of the
no-contest clause. The caveator's mother and other beneficiaries moved
to have the petition dismissed, alleging, among other things, that the
action of the caveator was not a violation of the no-contest clause
because the caveat had been dismissed for lack of standing.26
The Georgia Supreme Court disagreed, pointing to the language of the
clause that spoke of a beneficiary contesting or initiating legal proceedings to contest the validity of the will.27 The court held that "[the]
initiation of legal proceedings triggered the in terrorem clause.""
The no-contest clause in a trust in Callaway v. Willard" applied
should any of the settlor's four children
seek or file a legal or equitable challenge to the management decisions
made or proposed by my trustee during the administration of this

Thust, or pertaining to the management of the Trust Estate, or in
regards to the final distribution of the Trust Estate, and be unsuccess-

ful in said legal or equitable challenge."o
After the trust was established, three of the settlor's four children
engaged in litigation that involved the settlor. The settlor's daughter
and two of her sons attempted unsuccessfully to have a guardianship
imposed upon their mother. Those same two sons also filed an action in
which they sought to have the trustee removed and sought to have the
trust set aside due to the alleged undue influence, coercion, and duress
of the third son. The trustee was the personal lawyer of that son. When
the guardianship petition proved unsuccessful, the sons dropped the
lawsuit. The trustee then sought a judgment declaring that all three
children had violated the no-contest clause of the trust, and thus the
only beneficiary who was still eligible to take trust benefits was the son
who was the trustee's client."

admitted to probate. See RADFORD, WLLS AND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 2, § 6:16.
25. Norman v. Gober (Norman 1), 288 Ga. 754, 755, 707 S.E.2d 98, 99 (2011).

26. Norman II, 292 Ga. at 353, 737 S.E.2d at 310-11.
27.

Id. at 354, 737 S.E.2d at 311.

28. Id. (italics added).
29. 321 Ga. App. 349, 739 S.E.2d 533 (2013).
30.
31.

Id. at 350, 739 S.E.2d at 535.
Id. at 351-52, 739 S.E.2d at 535-36.
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The court of appeals examined carefully the wording of the no-contest
clause to determine whether the three children had violated it.32 The
court noted first that the daughter had not been party to any action
brought against the trust or trustee.3 3 When the trustee sought to have
her declared a "de facto party" to the sons' action, the court of appeals
construed the no-contest clause narrowly and declared that the daughter
must have been an actual, named party to an action to run afoul of the
clause.' As to the two sons, the court of appeals also held that they
had not violated the no-contest clause.3 ' The court pointed out that the
types of actions prohibited by the clause related to the trustee's conduct
in administering, managing, and distributing the trust assets, whereas
the sons' cause of action revolved around the trustee's conduct in setting
up the trust and having himself appointed as trustee.36
ransfer of Property to a Rust
A settlor establishes a trust by transferring his or her own property
to the trustee for management and distribution of the property in
accordance with the trust's terms. When settlors name themselves as
trustees, a question that arises is whether the mere declaring of oneself
as trustee of specified property is adequate to transfer the property out
of the ownership of the settlor and into the ownership of the trust. An
extension of that question is whether the settlor must actually own the
property at the time of declaring the trust or, alternatively, may declare
a trust over property that the settlor expects to acquire in the future.
Both of these questions were answered by the Georgia Court of Appeals
in Rose v. Waldrip."
The case of Rose v. Waldrip involved the type of contentious family
situation that often occurs when a testator or settlor is married to a
second spouse and has children from the first marriage.39 The testator
and settlor in this case, Lee Waldrip, died testate in March 2008 and
was survived by his daughter, Linda Rose, his granddaughter, Joy
Garcia, and his wife, Colleen, who was unrelated to either Linda Rose
or Joy. Linda Rose and Joy were beneficiaries of Waldrip's will, which
C.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 355, 739 S.E.2d at 358.
Id.
Id. at 355, 739 S.E.2d at 537-38.
Id. at 358, 739 S.E.2d 539-40.
Id.
See RADFORD, GEORGIA TRUSTS, supra note 15,
316 Ga. App. 812, 730 S.E.2d 529 (2012).
Id. at 812, 730 S.E.2d at 531.

§ 1:1.
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was executed in January 2008.40 Several years earlier, Waldrip had
established a revocable living trust that he later amended to make
Colleen the primary beneficiary upon his death. In April 2002, Waldrip
executed the trust agreement, creating the trust and naming himself as
trustee and primary beneficiary." The trust was intended to include
all of Waldrip's assets: "all bank accounts, all stocks, all bonds, all
accounts receivable, all business assets, all real estate, all motor
vehicles, all personal property, and all assets of any kind and wherever
located."' Additionally, the trust agreement was intended to bring into
the trust "any and all properties of all kinds, whether presently owned
or hereafter acquired."' The agreement clarified this intent by saying
that "[tihis declaration shall apply even though record ownership or title,
in some instances, may, presently or in the future, be registered in my
individual name, in which event such record ownership shall hereafter
be deemed held in trust.""
After executing the trust, Waldrip formally transferred some property
to the trust, but not all of his property had been so transferred upon his
death. Linda Rose and Joy contended that the property not transferred,
including property acquired by Waldrip after the trust was created,
remained part of his estate and thus should be used to fund the bequests
in the will."5 They based their argument on section 53-12-25 of the
Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.),4 6 which states that a
"[ltransfer of property to a trust shall require a [formal] transfer of legal
title to the trustee."' Colleen filed an action seeking a declaratory
judgment as to which assets, if any, were in Waldrip's estate. The
Superior Court of Hall County made two findings: (1) Waldrip had
intended that all property acquired by him after the creation of the trust

40. Id. The will provided an annuity for Linda Rose and forgave a debt that Joy owed
to the testator. Id.
41. Id. at 812-13, 730 S.E.2d at 531.
42. Id. at 813, 730 S.E.2d at 531.
43. Id. at 813, 730 S.E.2d at 532.
44. Id. (alteration in original). Contemporaneously with signing the Trust Agreement,
Waldrip executed a "Comprehensive Transfer Document" that contained similar language
about after-acquired property and the same language stating that assets held in his name
individually were deemed to be held in trust. Finally, on the same day, Waldrip executed
a Bill of Sale granting to himself as trustee his interest "in all tangible personal property
... [that] [Waldrip] presently ownied] or hereafter acquireId] (regardlessof the .. . record
title in which held)." Id. at 813-14, 730 S.E.2d at 532 (second alteration in original).
45. Id. at 814, 730 S.E.2d at 532.
46. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-25 (2011).
47. O.C.G.A. § 5 3- 12 -25(a).
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would be held in the trust, and (2) the provisions of the trust relating to
"after-acquired property" were enforceable under Georgia law.'
The court of appeals agreed with the first finding but not with the
second."' Although the trial court had limited its finding to the property
that was acquired after the trust was created, the court of appeals
engaged in an expanded examination of whether a formal transfer of
property was needed for property owned by the settlor when the trust
was created as well as property acquired by the settlor after the trust
was created.50 The court of appeals examined first whether O.C.G.A.
§ 53-12-25, which was enacted in 2010 as part of the Revised Georgia
Trust Code, would be applicable to Waldrip's trust." O.C.G.A. § 53-12152 provides that the provisions of the Revised Georgia Trust Code of
2010 govern all existing trusts regardless of the date they are created
"[e]xcept to the extent it would impair vested rights." The court of
appeals noted that Colleen's rights in the trust property vested when
Waldrip died in 2008, and thus, the requirement of a formal transfer
contained in O.C.G.A. § 53-12-25 of the 2010 Trust Code would not be
applicable to her if it created a requirement that did not exist in prior
Georgia trust law." The court of appeals turned to a case from a
nearby jurisdiction in Kentucky,5 and to the Second and Third
Restatements of Trusts because it found no pre-2010 Georgia statutory
or case law on point."
In the Kentucky case, Ladd v. Ladd," the Kentucky Court of Appeals
addressed whether a settlor's declaration of himself as trustee of
property sufficed to transfer the property to the trust.58 The court in
Ladd determined that it did." The Georgia Court of Appeals noted
that this conclusion was reflected in the Second and Third Restatements
of Trusts as well as in a leading treatise on trust law.o The court of

48. Rose, 316 Ga. App. at 812, 730 S.E.2d at 530-31.
49. Id. at 820-21, 730 S.E.2d at 535-36.
50. Id. at 816, 730 S.E.2d at 533.
51. Id. at 816-17, 730 S.E.2d at 533.
52. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-1 (2011).
53. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-1(b).
54. Rose, 316 Ga. App. at 816-17, 730 S.E.2d at 533-34 (interpreting O.C.G.A. § 53-1225).
55. Ladd v. Ladd, 323 S.W.3d 772 (Ky. Ct. App. 2010).
56. Rose, 316 Ga. App. at 817-18, 730 S.E.2d at 534 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS (1959), RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS (2003)).
57. 323 S.W.3d 772 (Ky. Ct. App. 2010).
58. Id. at 776-77.
59. Id. at 778.
60. Rose, 316 Ga. App. at 817-18, 730 S.E.2d at 534. The treatise relied upon by the
court of appeals was GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 141
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appeals held that the requirement in O.C.G.A. § 53-12-25 of a formal
transfer of property to a trust did not exist in Georgia prior to 2010, and
thus, the rule could not be applied to the Waldrip trust, at least as it
pertained to property owned by the settlor at the time the trust was
established."
The court of appeals next turned to the question of whether property
acquired after the trust came into existence would be considered trust
property by virtue of the broad language in the Waldrip trust documents.6 2 The court again turned to the Restatements and determined
that a settlor cannot transfer into trust any property that he does not
own currently but merely expects to own at some time in the future."
The court stated that after-acquired property will not be held in the
trust unless the settlor manifests an intent to hold that property in trust
after the property comes into the ownership of the settlor." The court
remanded the case to the trial court for a determination of whether the
settlor had shown such intent as to his after-acquired assets.
D.

Constructive TRusts
As early as 1848, Georgia has recognized that a court of equity may
impose an "implied trust" when it is clear that a transferor's intention
is that the property in question be held in trust rather than outright by
the holder of title to the property.6 6 There are two types of implied
trusts: resulting trusts and constructive trusts." "A constructive trust
is a trust implied whenever the circumstances are such that the person
holding legal title to property, either from fraud or otherwise, cannot

(2d ed. 1979). The court of appeals noted in a footnote that Georgia appellate courts rely
often on the Restatements of Trusts and the Bogert treatise when addressing issues of
Georgia trust law. Rose, 316 Ga. App. at 818 n.6, 730 S.E.2d at 535 n.6.
61. Rose, 316 Ga. App. at 819, 730 S.E.2d at 535.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. The court of appeals quoted the black-letter law and commentary of
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 86 and RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 41.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS
LAW OF TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 41 (2007).

§ 86 (1959);

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE

65. Rose, 316 Ga. App. at 820, 730 S.E.2d at 535.
66. Miller v. Cotten, 5 Ga. 341 (1848). Section 2290 of the 1860 Georgia Code defined
implied trusts as "such as are inferred by law from the nature of the transaction, or the
conduct of the parties." RICHARD H. CLARK, T.R.R. COBB & DAVID IRWIN, 1860 CODE
§ 2290 (1861), available at http://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/ga code/18. Similar provisions relating to implied trusts have appeared in the Georgia Code ever since. Article
7 of the REVISED GEORGIA TRUST CODE of 2010 (O.C.G.A. §§ 53-12-130 to -133 (2011)) is
devoted to implied trusts. See generally RADFORD, GEORGIA TRUSTS, supra note 15, ch. 6.
67. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-2(5) (2011).
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enjoy the beneficial interest in the property without violating some
Typically, a constructive trust is
established principle of equity."'
imposed on property belonging to a person who obtained title to the
property by that person's own fraud or malfeasance.69
In Reinhardt University v. Castleberry,o the Georgia Court of
Appeals examined a situation in which a constructive trust was sought
to be imposed on a university that itself had not engaged in any fraud
or other wrongdoing." This case revolved around a trust that was
established by a father to benefit his wife for her lifetime with the
remainder to be paid to his children. One of his sons was the trustee of
the trust and was also a trustee of Reinhardt University (then known as
Reinhardt College, hereinafter, the "University"). Although the trust did
not authorize distributions to anyone other than the wife during her life,
the trustee made a donation of $1 million from the trust to the
University. After the wife died, one of the other children brought an
action against her brother (the trustee) for breach of fiduciary duty and
a separate action against the University in which she sought to have a
constructive trust imposed on the $1 million donation. The University
moved to dismiss the claim against it for failure to state a cause of
action, stating that the petition did not include any independent
allegation of wrongdoing by the University."
The court of appeals agreed with the Superior Court of Cherokee
County's denial of the motion to dismiss. 3 The court of appeals cited
a Georgia case, Kelly v. Johnston,4 in which the Georgia Supreme
Court held that a constructive trust could be imposed even if a third
party, who was not a party to the action, had been the one who engaged
in the wrongful acts that gave rise to the need for the constructive
trust. The court of appeals also did not find merit in the University's
second argument, which was that its heavy reliance on charitable

68. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-132(a).
69. See, e.g., Grant v. Hart, 192 Ga. 153, 14 S.E.2d 860 (1941). In early cases, this
person was sometimes referred to as a "trustee ex maleficio." See, e.g., Cordovano v. State,
61 Ga. App. 590, 7 S.E.2d 45 (1940).
70. 318 Ga. App. 416, 734 S.E.2d 117 (2012).
71. Id. at 417, 734 S.E.2d at 118.
72. Id. at 416-17, 734 S.E.2d at 117-18. The University argued that the complaint only
sought the imposition of a constructive trust, and that a constructive trust is a remedy
rather than an independent cause of action. Id. at 417, 734 S.E.2d at 118. The University
relied on St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co. v. Meeks, 270 Ga. 136, 508 S.E.2d 646 (1998).
Reinhardt Univ., 318 Ga. App. at 418, 734 S.E.2d at 118.
73. Reinhardt Univ., 318 Ga. App. at 418, 734 S.E.2d at 119.
74. 258 Ga. 660, 373 S.E.2d 7 (1988).
75. Id. at 661, 734 S.E.2d at 8.
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donations would dictate against it investigating the sources of donated
funds." The court stated briefly that the University had "failed to
demonstrate any merit in [this] assertion.""
E. Adult Guardianship
Article 4 of Title 29 of the O.C.G.A." provides the procedure whereby
a probate court may appoint a guardian for an adult who has been found
incapable of making "significant responsible decisions concerning his or
her health or safety."79 The procedure requires notice to the proposed
ward and others, appointment of legal counsel for the proposed ward, an
evaluation of the proposed ward followed by the submission of an
evaluation report, and a hearing.o These actions are spread out over
a period of time, in part, due to time periods that are mandated by the
O.C.G.A.; however, if the need for the appointment of a guardian is
so pressing that compliance with these time requirements would be
detrimental to the proposed ward, the petitioner for the guardianship
may ask for the appointment of an "emergency guardian" without giving
notice to anyone other than the proposed ward.8 2 The time periods set
forth in the statutory procedure for the appointment of an emergency
guardian are compressed so that the emergency guardian can be
appointed as soon as possible." To proceed under this expedited
procedure, the petitioner must show "facts that establish an immediate

76. Reinhardt Univ., 318 Ga. App. at 417, 419-20, 734 S.E.2d at 117, 120.
77. Id. at 419, 734 S.E.2d at 120.
78. O.C.G.A. §§ 29-4-1 to -3 (2007 & Supp. 2013).
79.

O.C.G.A.

§ 29-4-1(a).

See MARY F. RADFORD, GEORGIA GUARDIANSHIP

AND

CONSERVATORSHIP ch. 4 (2013-2014 ed.), for an in-depth discussion of the guardianship of
adults.
80. O.C.G.A. § 29-4-11 (2007); O.C.G.A. § 29-4-12 (2007). See generally RADFORD,
GEORGIA GUARDIANSHIP, supra note 79,

§§

4:3 to 4:8 for a description of the procedure.

81. O.C.G.A. §§ 29-4-11, 29-4-12. For example, O.C.G.A. § 29-4-11(d)(3) requires a time
lapse of at least five days between the time that the proposed ward receives notice of the
petition and the time the court-appointed evaluator will be allowed to conduct the
evaluation. O.C.G.A. § 29-4-11(d)(3). Also, O.C.G.A. § 29-4-12(c) requires a time lapse of
at least ten days between notice of the hearing and the hearing itself. O.C.G.A. § 29-412(c).
82. O.C.G.A. § 29-4-16(b) (2007). The appointment of an emergency guardian is only
temporary, as an emergency guardianship will be effective for a maximum of sixty days.
O.C.G.A.

§ 29-4-16(b).

See RADFORD, GEORGIA GUARDIANSHIP, supra note 79,

§ 4:11

for

a discussion of emergency guardianships.
83. O.C.G.A. § 29-4-15(c) (2007). O.C.G.A. § 29-4-15(c)(3) requires the evaluation of the
proposed ward to take place within seventy-two hours of the time the judge orders the
evaluation. Id. Also, O.C.G.A. § 29-4-15(c)(2) requires the hearing on the emergency
guardianship to be conducted between the third and fifth day after the petition is filed.
Id.
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and substantial risk of death or serious physical injury, illness, or
disease unless an emergency guardian is appointed.""
In In re Farr," the Georgia Court of Appeals made it clear that a
petitioner cannot take advantage of the shortened time periods in the
emergency guardianship statutes simply because the petitioner would
prefer for the guardianship to be put into place as soon as possible.86
The proposed ward in this case was a hospital patient who was suffering
from end-stage Parkinson's disease, diabetes, and other ailments. The
petitioner for the emergency guardianship was the hospital. The
hospital contended that an emergency guardian should be appointed to
facilitate the patient's discharge from the hospital to a nursing facility
that the hospital deemed to be more appropriate for her care. The
patient's son objected to the petition." The Probate Court of Chatham
County held a hearing at which it determined that the only "emergency"
alleged by the hospital was its desire to have the patient discharged.
The probate court dismissed the petition."
The court of appeals agreed with the probate court that the hospital's
desire to have a patient transferred to another facility was not an
"emergency" within the meaning of the emergency guardianship
statute.89 The hospital did not allege any facts that showed that the
patient was "threatened by an immediate and substantial risk of death,
serious physical injury, illness, or disease necessitating such a discharge
and transfer."o
II.

GEORGIA LEGISLATION

Probate Court ProsecutingAttorney
In addition to matters relating to decedents' estates and the guardianships of minors and incapacitated adults, the Georgia probate courts
have jurisdiction over a variety of criminal matters, some of which may
require the prosecution of defendants for the violation of laws such as
traffic laws or weapons-carry-license laws." Unlike superior courts,

A.

84. O.C.G.A. § 29-4-14(b)(4) (2007).
85. 322 Ga. App. 55, 743 S.E.2d 615 (2013).
86. Id. at 56-57, 743 S.E.2d at 616.
87. Id. at 55, 743 S.E.2d at 615-16. According to the court, the son did not dispute that
his mother might eventually need a guardian but rather that she needed an emergency
guardian immediately. Id. at 56 n.3, 743 S.E.2d at 616 n.3.
88. Id. at 55, 743 S.E.2d at 616.
89. Id. at 56-57, 743 S.E.2d at 616.
90. Id.
91. O.C.G.A. § 15-9-30 (2012); O.C.G.A. § 16-11-129 (2011).
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municipal courts, and state courts, the probate courts do not have access
to a staff of attorneys to prosecute cases in their courts on behalf of the
state.9 2
In 2013, the Georgia General Assembly enacted new Article 8 of
Chapter 9 of Title 15,9 which authorizes the appointment of a "prosecuting attorney of the probate court" in those counties that have no state
court.94 The probate court is authorized to request the district attorney
of the county to handle criminal cases that are subject to the jurisdiction
of the probate court." District attorneys may do so themselves or may
appoint a member of their staff to do so." The district attorney or the
staff member will be compensated as authorized by the governing board
of the county.9 If for some reason the district attorney is unable to
assist, the county is authorized, in its discretion, to appoint someone to
the office of "prosecuting attorney of the probate court,"" who will serve
at the pleasure of the governing authority of the county.99
The probate court prosecuting attorney must be a member of the State
Bar of Georgia who is admitted to practice in the Georgia appellate
courts.'o An assistant district attorney of that county or another
county may be appointed to the office provided the district attorney who
employs the assistant district attorney consents."0 ' An attorney who
works full-time as the probate court prosecuting attorney may not
engage in the private practice of law. 0 2 If the attorney is only working part-time in this position, the attorney may engage in private
practice but may not practice in the probate court or appear in any court
in any matter in which that attorney has exercised jurisdiction.0 o

92: See generally Ga. S. Bill 120, Reg. Sess., 2013 Ga. Laws 565 (2013).
93. Id. (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 15-9-150 to -158 (Supp. 2013)).
94. O.C.G.A. § 15-9-150(b).
95. O.C.G.A. § 15-9-150(a).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. O.C.G.A. § 15-9-150(b).
99. O.C.G.A. § 15-9-150(d).
100. O.C.G.A. § 15-9-151(a).
101. O.C.G.A. § 15-9-151(b).
102. O.C.G.A. § 15-9-153(b).
103. O.C.G.A. § 15-9-153(c). The first sentence of the code section states: "Any parttime prosecuting attorney of a probate court and any part-time assistant prosecuting
attorney of a probate court may engage in the private practice of law, but shall not practice
in the probate court or appear in any matter in which that prosecuting attorney has
exercised jurisdiction." Id. This Author assumes that this is a blanket prohibition against
the part-time probate court prosecuting attorney practicing in any matter in the probate
court. However, it would not be unreasonable to interpret the law as meaning that the
part-time prosecuting attorney of the probate court is only prohibited from appearing in
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The prosecuting attorney of the probate court will represent the state
in cases within the jurisdiction of the probate court that involve
violations of county laws or ordinances and that could result in
confinement or the imposition of a fine or civil penalty under O.C.G.A.
§ 40-6-163 o4 (which relates to overtaking and passing a school bus),
offenses that are in violation of state laws over which the probate court
has jurisdiction, and, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-11-129,'0s in the
prosecution of any denial or revocation of a weapons-carry license under
O.C.G.A. § 16-11-129.106 The prosecuting attorney of the probate court
will also represent the state in any appeal from the probate court to the
superior court or one of the Georgia appellate courts, or in any case in
which a defendant who was convicted in probate court is challenging the
conviction through habeas corpus.'
The prosecuting attorney of the probate court may also administer
oaths to the bailiffs or other officers of the court and otherwise assist the
probate judge in court organization."0 o The prosecuting attorney of the
probate court may employ one or more assistant prosecuting attorneys
and other employees as authorized by local law or the governing body of
the county.'0 9 Additionally, assistance in the prosecution of cases in
the probate court may be supplied by a law student or law graduate who
is allowed to practice pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-18-22110 or to the
Georgia Supreme Court's rules.'
B. Expanded Notice in Adult Guardianshipand Conservatorship
Proceedings
In 2013, the Georgia General Assembly amended the 2005 Guardianship and Conservatorship Code"' in an attempt to address the situathe probate court in a matter that would involve work as the prosecuting attorney.
104. O.C.G.A. § 40-6-163 (2011).
105. O.C.G.A. § 16-11-129 (2011).
106. O.C.G.A. § 15-9-155(a).
107. O.C.G.A. § 15-9-155(a)(2)-(3).
108. O.C.G.A. § 15-9-155(a)(4).
109. O.C.G.A. § 15-9-157.
110. O.C.G.A. § 15-18-22 (2012). Section 15-18-22, which is known as the "The Law
School Public Prosecutor Act of 1970," allows third-year law students or qualified staff
instructors at law schools, as part of their legal intern training, to assist the district
attorney in criminal proceedings. O.C.G.A. § 15-18-22.
111. O.C.G.A. § 15-9-158.
112. O.C.G.A. tit. 29 (2007 & Supp. 2013). The "guardian" of an adult is an individual
who is appointed by a probate court to make personal decisions (e.g., give medical consents,
choose place of residence) for an adult who has been found to be incapable of making
"significant responsible decisions concerning his or her health or safety." O.C.G.A. § 29-41(a). See RADFORD, GEORGIA GUARDIANSHIP, supra note 79, ch. 4, for an in-depth
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tion in which an adult lives in one state but has been transported by a
relative or friend to another state so that the transporting individual
This
may be appointed as the adult's guardian or conservator."'
situation usually occurs when there is a dispute among family members
as to who should control the property and welfare of an elderly relative.
An illustration of this situation would be if a widowed, elderly,
incapacitated, and wealthy grandmother, whose children have all
predeceased her, lives in Alabama with one of her granddaughters. Her
grandson, a Georgia resident, decides to move her to Georgia and become
her guardian and conservator even though he knows the granddaughter
would object if she were to find out about these proceedings. Under the
law prior to 2013, if there were at least two other grandchildren living
in Georgia, the petitioning grandson would only be required to give
notice to the Georgia grandchildren."' The granddaughter in Alabama
would not be notified and thus would not have the opportunity to object
to the appointment of the grandson as guardian."'
The 2013 legislation adds the requirement that a petitioner for the
guardianship or conservatorship of an adult include in the petition the
name of "[alny state in which the proposed ward was physically present,
including any period of temporary absence, for at least six consecutive
months immediately before the filing of the petition or ending within the
six months prior to the filing of the petition.""' In the event such a
state is listed, amended O.C.G.A. § 29-9-7" directs the probate judge
to issue notice of the filing of the guardianship petition to the individu-

discussion of the guardianship of adults.
113. Ga. H.R. Bill 446, Reg. Sess., 2004 Ga. Laws 161 (codified at O.C.G.A. ch. 29-9).
A conservator is a person appointed by a probate court to make financial decisions for an
adult who has been found to be incapable of making "significant responsible decisions
concerning the management of his or her property." O.C.G.A. § 29-5-1(a) (2007). See
RADFORD, GEORGIA GUARDIANSHIP, supra note 79, ch. 5, for an in-depth discussion of the
conservatorship of adults.
114. O.C.G.A. § 29-4-10(b)(7) (2007); O.C.G.A. § 29-4-11(c)(3); O.C.GA. § 29-5-10(b)(8)
(2007); O.C.G.A. § 29-5-11(c)(3) (2007). The person seeking guardianship or conservatorship must give notice of the petition to the proposed ward's spouse, adult children, and, if
there are no adult children, then to at least two individuals in the following order of
priority: lineal descendants, parents and siblings, or friends of the proposed ward.
O.C.G.A. § 29-4-19(bX7); O.C.GA. § 29-4-11(cX3); O.C.G.A. § 29-5-10(b)(8); O.C.GA. § 29-511(c)(3).
115. Under O.C.G.A. § 29-4-12(c), the individuals who are entitled to notice of the filing
of the petition are also entitled to receive notice of the hearing that will be held to
determine whether a guardianship is necessary and who shall serve as guardian. O.C.G.A.
§ 29-4-12(c).
116. O.C.G.A. §§ 29-4-10(b)(17), 29-5-10(b)(19) (Supp. 2013).
117. O.C.G.A. § 29-9-7 (Supp. 2013).
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als who reside in that state and who fall into the category of individuals
to whom notice shall be given."18 The notice is to be given in "such
additional manner as ... might be reasonably calculated to give actual
notice to such persons" and may be given by publication.'
In the situation described above, the amended law would require the
petitioning Georgia grandson to give notice to the Alabama granddaughter as well as to the Georgia grandsons, giving the granddaughter the
opportunity to object to the petition. The 2013 legislation is loosely
modeled after Article 2 of the Uniform Adult Guardianship and
Protective Proceedings Jurisdiction Act,'s which was promulgated by
the Uniform Law Commission in 2007.121

118. Id. In the situation described in the text, the grandmother has no surviving
spouse or adult children, so two of the grandmother's lineal descendants in Alabama as
well as two descendants in Georgia must be given notice of the petition.
119. Id.
120.

UNIF. ADULT GUARDIANSHIP & PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS JURISDICTION ACT (2007),

available at www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Adult#Guardianship#and#Protective#
Proceeding#Jurisdiction#Act.
121. Id.
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